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ROPER V. SIMMONS: THE COLLISION OF
NATIONAL CONSENSUS AND
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989, the Supreme Court held in Stanford v. Kentucky that imposing
the death penalty on criminals who were under the age of eighteen at the
time of their crime did not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.' The Court ruled that determining
whether a punishment was cruel or unusual demanded an inquiry into the
"evolving standards of decency" in society at that particular moment in time
toward the punishment in question.2 Thus, for example, while drawing and
quartering, beheading, or burning people alive were not always considered
cruel and unusual punishments, today our standards of decency hold such
sentences are no longer a socially acceptable form of punishment. 3 In
Stanford, the Court found that the standards of decency in 1989 did not
indicate a clear national consensus against executing capital offenders for
crimes committed while the offender was under the age of eighteen.4
Accordingly, the Stanford Court held that the individual states retained
discretion whether to permit the death penalty for juvenile capital
offenders.5 However, the Court's framework implicitly left open the
possibility that an evolution in American society's standards of decency
could render its 1989 determinations moot, thereby triggering Eighth
Amendment protections for juvenile offenders facing a death sentence if
' 492 U.S. 361, 366 (1989). Stanford, age seventeen, was convicted of murder, sodomy,
robbery, and the receipt of stolen property, and sentenced to death under a Kentucky law
allowing the death penalty for juveniles convicted of class A felonies.
2 Id. at 369.
3 See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878) ("[I]t is safe to affirm that
punishments of torture, such as those mentioned by the commentator referred to, and all
others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the
Constitution.").
4 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
5 Id.
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such a punishment were found to be cruel and unusual in light of American
society's ever-evolving standards of decency.6
In 2004, Christopher Simmons, sentenced to death for a first degree
murder committed at age seventeen, challenged his death sentence on
precisely those grounds, arguing that the standards of decency in American
society had evolved to the point that a national consensus existed against
executing a criminal for crimes he committed while under the age of
eighteen, and that therefore his death sentence was cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.7 Simmons relied upon
the Supreme Court's 2002 decision in Atkins v. Virginia that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of mentally retarded persons because
such persons categorically lack the mental culpability to be held fully
accountable for their criminal actions, and, therefore, imposing the death
penalty, the punishment reserved only for the most culpable of offenders, is
cruel and unusual. 8 Analogously, Simmons argued that minors under the
age of eighteen should not be held fully accountable for their crimes
because, like mentally retarded persons, they had not reached full
intellectual maturity and therefore did not possess the requisite culpability
necessary to justify the imposition of the death penalty.
Undoubtedly, the Roper decision is a logical outgrowth of the Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Atkins. Atkins restricted the autonomy of the
states to make individualized determinations of culpability for mentally
retarded persons, instead declaring that mentally retarded persons, as a
class, were entitled to the presumption that they lacked the necessary level
of criminal culpability for a state to impose the death penalty. The Court's
decision was rooted in two central findings. First, the Court found that the
indicia of national consensus indicated that the majority of American
society did not approve of executing the mentally retarded. 9 Second, the
Court found that the death penalty was inherently disproportionate for
mentally retarded persons because their cognitive impairments made them
less than fully accountable for their actions.10 Unsurprisingly, Roper
extends this line of reasoning to the juvenile death penalty, holding that the
immaturity and imperfect intellectual development of sixteen and
seventeen-year-olds, similar to the cognitive impairments of mentally
retarded persons in Atkins, prevents them from having sufficient
6 id.
7 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 559-60 (2005).
' 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
9 Id. at 316.
'0 Id. at 318.
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responsibility for their actions to warrant the death penalty. 1" Roper also
contends that the indicia of national consensus show that American society
no longer approves of the death penalty for juvenile offenders. 2
Accordingly, the Roper decision is consistent with the reasoning of Atkins.
However, although Roper follows in the footsteps of Atkins, it does not
mean the precedent set in Atkins ought to have been continued. In deciding
Roper, the Court once again undermines the legitimacy and competency of
the American jury system and continues to tread on state autonomy by
making broad prohibitions against the death penalty for entire classes of
citizens. Exceeding the scope of Atkins, the Roper court delves into the
comparatively murkier issues regarding the culpability of mentally astute
seventeen-year-olds, and permanently removes the question of a juvenile's
ultimate accountability from the dominion of the states.
In addition to usurping state autonomy, the Roper decision is
problematic because it is based on an unconvincing measure of what
constitutes a national consensus. Moreover, the Court forwardly adopts the
view that its independent judgment is essential to determine the
acceptability of a particular punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
13
These developments are a fundamental alteration of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, undercutting the centrality of a national consensus
established in Stanford and reaffirmed in Atkins. This Note argues that
Roper, while internally consistent with Atkins, illustrates the Court's
willingness to continue chipping away at the role of states and juries in
criminal sentencing proceedings by reducing the threshold necessary to
establish a national consensus and focusing Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence on the Justices' subjective judgment regarding the bounds of
acceptable punishment.
II. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
A. THE BEGINNING OF MODERN EIGHTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE: WEEMS V UNITED STATES
The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.' 14 The origins of modem Eighth Amendment jurisprudence can
Roper, 543 U.S. at 570-71.
12 Id. at 567.
'3 Id. at 563-64.
14 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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be traced to Weems v. United States, where the Supreme Court held it was
cruel and unusual punishment to punish a man convicted of falsifying
government documents to a sentence of "twelve years and one day, a chain
at the ankle and wrist of the offender, hard and painful labor, no assistance
from friend or relative, no marital authority or parental rights or rights of
property, no participation even in the family council." 5  The Court
speculated that because of the Eighth Amendment's vagueness, it "may be
therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice."
16
The Court further explained that the Eighth Amendment reflected an
underlying belief that a punishment must be "graduated and proportioned to
the offense."' 7 The Court ultimately concluded that the fact that there was
no difference in the punishment for falsifying public documents resulting in
small thefts and the punishment for falsifying public documents resulting in
large thefts made the twelve-year sentence excessive and unusually severe,
because the sentence did not proportionally serve the government's interest
in preventing the falsification of documents.
18
B. EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY: TROP V. DULLES
Several decades later, the Supreme Court held in Trop v. Dulles that it
was cruel and unusual punishment to revoke the citizenship of military
deserters.1 9 The majority explained:
While the state has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this
power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards. Fines, imprisonment and
even execution may be imposed depending upon the enormity of the crime, but any
technique outside the bounds of these traditional penalties is constitutionally
suspect.2°
Coining a phrase that continues to dominate today's Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court declared, "[t]he Amendment must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."'2' The Court determined that revoking an
individual's citizenship would subject that individual to a lifetime of
banishment and statelessness, a fate that was universally condemned by the
views of the civilized nations of the world and permitted only in two other
" 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910).
16 Id. at 378.
17 Id. at 366-67.
18 Id. at 380.
'9 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
20 Id. at 100.
21 Id. at 101.
950 [Vol. 96
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nations.2 2 Based on these findings, the Court concluded that the Eighth
Amendment prohibited Congress from revoking a person's citizenship.
23
C. A TWO-PRONG TEST EMERGES: GREGG V. GEORGIA
A more definitive framework evolved several years later in Gregg v.
Georgia, where the Court affirmed the death sentence of a man convicted of
first-degree murder.24 A two-pronged test was announced to determine
whether a punishment was acceptable under the Eighth Amendment.25
First, the Court examined modem standards of decency to evaluate whether
there was a national consensus against the death penalty.26 The Court
explained that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment did not apply only to punishments prohibited in the eighteenth
century, but that the "[a]mendment has been interpreted in a flexible and
dynamic manner., 27 Recycling language from Trop, the Court stated that
the "Eighth Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency which mark the progress of a maturing society. 28
This determination "requires that the court look to the objective indicia
which reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction., 29 The Court
found that contemporary society had endorsed the death penalty as
illustrated by thirty-five state laws that provided for it.
30
Second, the Court declared that a penalty must "accord with the
dignity of man" which was construed to prohibit excessive punishments.31
An excessive punishment is one that leads to "unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain" or is "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
crime."32  The Court determined that it must execute its independent
judgment as to whether a punishment was excessive and therefore violated
the dignity of man. The Court found that although the death penalty is an
extreme sanction, it was suitable for first degree murderers because they
had committed the most extreme of crimes. 33 The Court also explained that
22 Id. at 103. The two nations permitting revocations of citizenship were the Philippines
and Turkey. Id.
23 Id.
24 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
25 Id. at 173.
26 Id. at 172-73.
27 Id. at 171.
2 Id. at 173.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 179-80.
"' Id. at 173.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 182-83.
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the death penalty was not "so totally without penological justification that it
results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering. 34 Accordingly, the Court
found that the death penalty was not inherently disproportionate for the
crime of murder, and therefore did not intrinsically constitute cruel and
unusual punishment.
D. RAPE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: COKER V GEORGIA
Later in 1977, however, in Coker v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held
that imposing the death penalty for rape was a grossly disproportionate and
excessive punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. 35 The Court
determined that there was a national consensus against imposing the death
penalty for rape.36 Before Furman v. Georgia required the states to revise
their death penalty statutes to prevent arbitrary imposition of the death
penalty, 37 sixteen states had laws permitting the death penalty for rape.38 At
the time, nineteen other states had laws allowing the death penalty, but not
for rape.39 However, after Furman, only Georgia, Louisiana, and North
Carolina passed revised laws permitting the death penalty for rape.40 The
Court ascribed significance to the fact that only those states that previously
had laws permitting the death penalty for rape had decided to resurrect the
practice. 4  Eventually, the death penalty statutes in Louisiana and North
Carolina were struck down for requiring a mandatory death penalty.42 In
their new death penalty statutes, Louisiana and North Carolina chose not to
permit the death penalty for rape, leaving Georgia as the only state with a
law allowing the death penalty for rape.43 Based on this background, the
Court concluded "[t]he current judgment with respect to the death penalty
for rape is not wholly unanimous among state legislatures, but it obviously
weighs very heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable
penalty for raping an adult woman."44 The Court also cited the fact that
juries had very rarely imposed the death penalty for rapists as evidence of
growing disapproval for the practice.45
34 id.
3' 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
36 Id. at 596.
37 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
" Coker, 433 U.S. at 593.
'9 Id. at 595.
4" Id. at 594.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
4 Id. at 595.
41 Id. at 596-97.
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E. THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY: THOMPSON V OKLAHOMA AND
STANFORD V KENTUCKY
In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court, with a concurring vote from
Justice O'Connor, set aside a death penalty imposed on a fifteen-year-old
46murderer. The plurality concluded that executing persons who were less
than sixteen at the time of their crime was cruel and unusual punishment
because no death penalty state that had expressly considered the issue
47permitted the death penalty -for individuals under age sixteen, no person
under sixteen had been sentenced to death in over forty years,48 and
numerous professional organizations and many other nations felt juvenile
executions were uncivilized.49 The Thompson plurality stressed that "[t]he
reasons why juveniles are not trusted with privileges and responsibilities of
an adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally
reprehensible as that of an adult."50
However, Justice O'Connor, the decisive vote, explained there was not
a clear indication of a national consensus against executing fifteen-year-
olds.51 Rather, her concurrence was based on the
considerable risk that the Oklahoma Legislature either did not realize that its actions
would have the effect of rendering fifteen year-old defendants death eligible or did not
give the question the serious consideration that would have been reflected in the
explicit choice of some minimum age for death eligibility.
52
Justice O'Connor explained that even if most adolescents are "generally
less blameworthy than adults who commit similar crimes-it does not
necessarily follow that all fifteen-year-olds are incapable of the moral
culpability that would justify the imposition of capital punishment.
53
Thus, Justice O'Connor voted with the plurality only because the state had
not expressly considered whether the death penalty was acceptable for
fifteen-year-olds, explicitly noting that the ultimate moral issue of the age
for death penalty eligibility ought to "be addressed in the first instance by
those best suited to do so, the people's elected representatives. 54
One year later, the Court in Stanford v. Kentucky affirmed a death
sentence for an offender convicted of first degree murder at age seventeen,
46 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (plurality opinion).
47 Id. at 826 (plurality opinion).
48 Id. at 831-32 (plurality opinion).
49 Id. at 830 (plurality opinion).
5o Id. at 835 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
51 Id. at 848-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
52 Id. at 857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
53 Id. at 853 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
14 Id. at 858-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
:20061
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finding that the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit the execution of sixteen
and seventeen-year-olds. 5 Comporting with the framework established in
Gregg v. Georgia, a plurality of the Court, led by Justice Scalia, found there
was no national consensus prohibiting the execution of sixteen or
seventeen-year-olds 6 The Court explained that the proper indication of a
national consensus was to look strictly at statutes "passed by society's
elected representatives. 57 The Court further explained that the threshold
for a national consensus was high, requiring a state's practice to be a
significant outlier from the rest of the nation. 8 Finding that a majority of
death penalty states permitted capital punishment for those sixteen and
above, the plurality declared that the high threshold was not met.59
Additionally, the plurality claimed that little significance could be placed on
statistics indicating that juries were reluctant to impose the death penalty on
sixteen and seventeen-year-olds; arguing instead that these statistics showed
only that juries felt the juvenile death penalty should rarely be imposed.6 °
The plurality also discounted the relevance of laws establishing eighteen as
the legal age of adulthood and its accompanying responsibilities on two
grounds. First, the plurality argued that responsibilities like voting and jury
duty are far more complex than the basic understanding not to kill people.61
Second, the plurality contended that laws restricting privileges to those
eighteen and older reflected only a broad determination that juveniles are
frequently too immature to handle certain responsibilities, but that these
generalized determinations are distinct from the individualized
considerations of maturity one receives in a criminal jury trial.62 The
plurality explained "[i]t is our job to identify the evolving standards of
decency; to determine, not what they should be, but what they are. '63 The
plurality also discounted the weight that should be attached to the "so-called
proportionality analysis," noting that "we have never invalidated a
punishment on this basis alone" and that "all of our cases condemning a
punishment under this mode of analysis also found that the objective
indicators of state laws or jury determinations evidenced a societal
consensus against that penalty. 64
" 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (plurality opinion).
56 Id. at 373 (plurality opinion).
57 Id. at 370 (plurality opinion).
58 Id. at 370-71 (plurality opinion).
59 Id. at 371-72 (plurality opinion).
60 Id. at 373-74 (plurality opinion).
61 Id. at 374 (plurality opinion).
62 Id. at 374-75 (plurality opinion).
63 Id. at 378 (plurality opinion).
64 Id. at 379 (plurality opinion).
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F. MENTALLY HANDICAPPED AND THE DEATH PENALTY: PENRY V
L YNA UGH AND A TKINS V VIRGINIA
Following this trend, several years later the Court held in Penry v.
Lynaugh that it was not cruel and unusual to execute mentally retarded
persons because the objective indicia did not clearly establish that such
persons are uniformly unable to understand the wrongfulness of their
actions.65 The Court found that there was no national consensus against
executions of the mentally retarded, which were prohibited only by the
Federal Government and by one state that otherwise permitted the death
penalty.6 6 The Court further noted that the individual culpability of
mentally retarded defendants was always determined at trial, and that an
individualized inquiry was best able to account for the widely varying
ranges of intelligence and culpability among mentally retarded defendants.6 7
However, over a decade later, the Court overturned Penry, ruling that
it was now cruel and unusual to impose a death sentence on mentally
retarded persons.6 8 The Court maintained that a national consensus was still
centrally important to its decision, but explained that it was not wholly
determinative.69  Instead, the Court held that in deciding whether
punishment is cruel and unusual, the Court must use its own judgment to
see if "there is reason to disagree with the judgment reached by the
citizenry and its legislators., 70  The Court found a national consensus
because, since Penry, eighteen states had enacted laws prohibiting
execution of mentally retarded offenders 7 and only five mentally retarded
persons had been convicted during that period 2 The Court also referenced
the viewpoints of many private organizations and foreign nations, which
overwhelmingly disapproved of the practice. The Court further argued
that the death penalty for mentally retarded persons did not fulfill its
penological goal of retribution, noting "[i]f the culpability of the average
murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the
State, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not
merit that form of retribution., 74 Additionally, the Court found that the
65 492 U.S. 302, 338 (1989).
66 Id. at 334.
67 Id. at 340.
68 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
69 Id. at 312.
70 Id. at 313.
7' Id. at 314-15.
72 Id. at 316.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 319.
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death penalty failed to deter mentally retarded persons from committing
murders because their mental disability prevented them from understanding
the actions that flow from their behavior. 75 Therefore, the Court concluded
that it was cruel and unusual to execute mentally retarded persons because
there was a national consensus against the practice, and the practice itself
did not relate to the goals of deterrence and retribution, the two principles
on which the Court had affirmed the death penalty in Gregg.76
III. ROPER V. SIMMONS: FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1. Simmons' Crime
At age seventeen, while a junior in high school, Christopher Simmons
committed a capital murder.77 Before the murder, Simmons told his friends
that he wanted to kill someone and that he believed he could "get away with
it" because he was a minor.78 Simmons was able to convince two of his
friends, fifteen-year-old Charles Benjamin and sixteen-year-old John
Tessmer, to accompany him in a plot to break into a home, kidnap a victim,
and then kill the victim by throwing him or her over a bridge into a body of
water so that he or she would drown.79
On the night of the murder, the three rendezvoused at two in the
morning. 8° However, Tessmer ended up leaving before Simmons and
Benjamin set out to commit the crimes.81 Shortly after Tessmer departed,
Simmons and Benjamin proceeded to break into the home of Shirley Crook
by reaching into an open window and unlocking the back door to her
house. The two entered the home, and Simmons turned on a hallway
light, which awakened Mrs. Crook.83 Simmons and Benjamin entered Mrs.
Crook's bedroom, where they used duct tape to cover Mrs. Crook's mouth
and eyes and bind her hands.84 The two then placed Mrs. Crook in her
75 Id.
76 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
77 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 556 (2005).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 id.
82 Id.
83 id.
84 Id.
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minivan and drove to a nearby state park.85 The perpetrators reinforced the
bindings around Mrs. Crook's hands, covered her head with a towel, and
walked her to a bridge.86 Simmons and Benjamin then tied Mrs. Crook's
hands with electric wire, wrapped her entire face in duct tape, and threw her
over the bridge, where she drowned in the water below.8 7 The next day,
Mrs. Crook's husband returned home from an overnight trip to find his
bedroom in disarray and reported that his wife was missing. 88 Later that
afternoon, the body of Mrs. Crook was found along the river.89 On the
same day, Simmons had been "bragging about the murder, telling his
friends that he had killed a woman 'because the bitch seen my face.'
9
2. Simmons' Conviction
The following day, police arrested Simmons at his high school after
receiving information that he had been involved in the murder.91 Simmons
waived his right to an attorney and confessed to the murder within two
hours, going so far as to perform a videotaped reenactment of the crime.92
The State of Missouri charged Simmons with burglary, kidnapping,
stealing, and first degree murder.93 Simmons was tried as an adult because,
at age seventeen, he was outside the criminal jurisdiction of Missouri's
juvenile court system. 94 Simmons was convicted based on the confession
and the videotaped reenactment of the crime, as well as the testimony from
Simmons' accomplice Tessmer that the three had premeditated the
murder.
95
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. The Penalty Stage
At the penalty stage, the State of Missouri sought the death penalty on
the grounds that the murder was committed for money, the perpetrators
attempted to prevent their lawful arrest by killing the victim, and that the
85 Id.
86 Id. at 556-57.
87 Id. at 557.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
9' Id. at 556-57.
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crime was outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman.9 6 The
State also introduced testimony from Mrs. Crook's husband, daughter, and
two sisters, who shared with the jury how the murder had devastated their
lives.
97
In mitigation, Simmons' lawyer introduced testimony from state
juvenile officers that Simmons' had no prior convictions or criminal
charges.98 Additionally, family friends and family members pleaded for
mercy on Simmons behalf, describing their close relationship with him.
99
Simmons' mother testified that he was a responsible and loving young man,
who often took care of his grandmother and two younger half brothers. 00
During closing arguments, Simmons' lawyer argued that juveniles of
Simmons' age could not drink, serve on juries, or watch certain movies
because "the legislatures have wisely decided that individuals of a certain
age aren't responsible enough."' 0' Simmons' lawyer further argued that
Simmons' age should make "a huge difference to [the jurors] in deciding
just exactly what sort of punishment to make."' 0 2  The prosecutor
responded: "Age, he says. Think about age. Seventeen years old. Isn't that
scary? Doesn't that scare you? Mitigating? Quite the contrary I submit.
Quite the contrary."'
0 3
The judge instructed the jury that they could consider Simmons' age as
a mitigating factor in determining his punishment.' 4 Nevertheless, the jury
recommended the death penalty after finding that the State had proved each
of the three statutory aggravating factors. 0 5 The judge accepted the jury's
recommendation and imposed the death penalty.1
0 6
2. Post-Conviction Motions
After the verdict and sentencing stage, Simmons obtained a new
lawyer, who moved in the trial court to set aside the conviction on the
grounds that Simmons had received ineffective counsel at trial. 107 The new
96 Id. at 557.
97 Id. at 558.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
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lawyer introduced testimony from Simmons' trial attorney, Simmons'
friends and neighbors, and clinical psychologists, generally supporting the
finding that Simmons was "very immature," "very impulsive," and "very
susceptible to being manipulated or influenced."' 10 8  The psychological
experts testified that Simmons came from a difficult home environment and
that he had suffered from dramatic changes in behavior and poor
performance at school. 10 9  Nevertheless, the Missouri Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion on the grounds that there was
no constitutional violation by reason of ineffective counsel."0 Simmons'
appeal for federal habeas corpus was subsequently denied.' 1'
However, the following year the United States Supreme Court held in
Atkins v. Virginia that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of
mentally retarded persons because such persons categorically lacked the
necessary mental culpability. 1 2 Simmons filed a new petition, arguing that
Atkins established that the Constitution similarly prohibited the execution of
a juvenile who was under eighteen when the crime was committed."H3 The
Missouri Supreme Court agreed, holding that since Stanford v. Kentucky,
a national consensus has developed against the execution of juvenile offenders, as
demonstrated by the fact that eighteen states now bar such executions for juveniles,
that twelve other states bar executions altogether, that no state has lowered its age of
execution below eighteen since Stanford, that five states have legislatively or by case
law raised or established the minimum age at eighteen, and that the imposition of the
juvenile death penalty has become truly unusual over the last decade.
11
Accordingly, the Missouri Supreme Court set aside Simmons' death
sentence and sentenced him to "life imprisonment without eligibility for
probation, parole, or release except by act of the Governor.""' 5 The State of
Missouri appealed the decision, and the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 116
108 Id. at 558-59.
109 Id. at 559.
110 Id.
11 Id.
"' 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
113 Roper, 543 U.S. at 559.
114 Id. at 559-60 (quoting State ex reL Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo.
2003), aff'd, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)).
115 Id. at 560 (quoting Roper, 112 S.W.3d at 413).
116 Id.
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IV. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: ROPER V. SIMMONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
In a five-to-four decision, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
affirmed the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court, holding that the
execution of individuals who were under eighteen years of age at the time
of their capital crimes is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.1 1 7 The
decision directly overturned Stanford v. Kentucky, which had held that
executing an individual for crimes committed at sixteen or seventeen years
of age did not violate the evolving standards of decency and thus did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 118
At the outset, Justice Kennedy explained that the Eighth Amendment
"guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive
sanctions," a right which is based on the basic "precept of justice that
punishment should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense." 119 This
guarantee "reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all
persons."'120  The majority began its analysis by affirming the Missouri
Supreme Court's reliance on the "evolving standards of decency"
framework to evaluate whether a punishment is so disproportionate to the
crime to be cruel and unusual, thereby violating the Eighth Amendment.1
2
1
The majority traced the wavering historical application of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 22  The
majority first explained that its recent holding in Atkins v. Virginia, that the
Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of the mentally retarded,
resulted, in part, from an evolution in society's standards of decency.
123
Thus, Penry v. Lynaugh, which had previously held mentally retarded
persons could be executed because there was no national consensus
prohibiting such executions, was directly overturned in Atkins in part
because the "objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed in
legislative enactments and state practice with respect to executions of the
mentally retarded" signaled that executing mentally retarded offenders had
"become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national consensus has
developed against it.'
124
"' Id. at 578-88 (joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter, JJ.).
118 Id. at 574-75.
19 Id. at 560.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 560-61.
122 Id. at 561-64.
123 Id. at 561.
124 Id. at 562-63 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314-16 (2002)).
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However, Justice Kennedy also explained that the Court's decision in
Atkins did not end with the question of whether a national consensus
existed, but also rejected the position previously taken in Stanford, that the
Court's independent judgment had no bearing on the acceptability of a
particular punishment under the Eighth Amendment.' 25  Instead, the
majority "returned to the rule, established in decisions predating Stanford,
that 'the Constitution contemplates that in the end our judgment will be
brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty
under the Eighth Amendment."",126 Thus, Justice Kennedy explained that
the Court in Atkins was authorized to make the independent determination
that "the impairments of mentally retarded offenders make it less defensible
to impose the death penalty as retribution for past crimes and less likely that
the death penalty will have a real deterrent effect."'
127
Having set the stage for reconsideration of juvenile death sentences,
the majority summarized by explaining that although indicia of a national
consensus provided the Court with an essential instruction, the question of
whether the data supported the existence of a national consensus was no
longer the exclusive inquiry. 28  Rather, after determining whether a
national consensus existed, the Court must then determine, "in the exercise
of our own independent judgment, whether the death penalty is a
disproportionate punishment for juveniles."'
29
1. Evidence of a National Consensus
The majority began by explaining that the factors it would use in
determining whether a national consensus against the juvenile death penalty
existed would parallel the factors used in its examination of a national
consensus against executing mentally retarded persons in Atkins. 3 ° First,
the majority noted that a total of thirty states did not permit the juvenile
death penalty, of which eighteen permitted the death penalty for adults but
not juveniles, and twelve that categorically abolished the death penalty.' 3'
The numerical breakdown of states prohibiting the juvenile death penalty
was identical to that in Atkins, where eighteen states permitted the death
penalty but not for mentally retarded persons, and twelve states abolished
125 Id. at 563.
126 Id. (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314).
127 Id.
... Id. at 564.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 id.
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the death penalty entirely. 132 Second, the majority found that among the
remaining twenty states without formal prohibitions against executing
juveniles, the practice was infrequent-only six states had executed
prisoners for crimes committed as juveniles since Stanford, and over the
previous ten years, only Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia actually did so.'
33
Again, the infrequent number of times the death sentence was actually
imposed on juveniles was comparable to that in Atkins, where only five
states had actually executed mentally retarded persons since Penry.
134
Lastly, however, the majority recognized a divergence from Atkins in terms
of the number of states that had restricted juvenile executions.13 5 In the
buildup to Atkins, eighteen states affirmatively prohibited execution of the
mentally retarded. 36  Yet, only five states had imposed restraints on
juvenile executions since the practice was upheld in Penry.'37 Unlike in
Atkins, where thirty-six percent of states (eighteen out of fifty) proactively
prohibited the punishment, only ten percent of states (five out of fifty) did
so in the buildup to Roper, a cumulative reduction of twenty-six percent.
Nevertheless, the majority found that the change in five states' laws
was significant enough to indicate a new consensus regarding society's
standards of decency towards the juvenile death penalty.' 38 The majority
placed great importance on the consistent direction of change, noting that
"[ilt is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the
consistency of the direction of the change., 139 Thus, the general trend in
prohibiting juvenile death sentences, coupled with the fact that no state had
affirmatively reauthorized juvenile death sentences, carried "special force"
in light of the general popularity of anticrime legislation and the trend of
cracking down on juvenile crime. 40 The majority thus concluded that the
slower rate of change was counterbalanced by its consistent direction.
14
The majority further suggested that the slower rate of change concerning
the juvenile death penalty could be explained because at the time Stanford
was decided, twelve states already prohibited execution of juveniles under
eighteen, and fifteen states had prohibited execution of juveniles under
132 Id.
... Id. at 564-65.
134 Id.
131 Id. at 565.
136 Id.
137 Id.
' Id. at 565-66.
'39 Id. at 566 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 325 (2002)).
140 Id.
141 Id.
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seventeen, implying that there was less room for change to occur. 14 2 The
majority also observed that the Senate had ratified the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights only because of a ban on the
juvenile death penalty was expressly excluded. 143 However, the majority
found the treaty alone did not provide a clear indication of consensus.'
44
Ultimately, the majority concluded that the infrequent use of the
juvenile death penalty where it still existed, coupled with its rejection in a
majority of states, and the consistent trend towards abolition of the juvenile
death penalty cumulatively provided enough evidence that the modem
standard of decency in American society was moving away from the
execution of juveniles because they are "categorically less culpable than the
average criminal.' 45
2. Independent Analysis of Whether the Juvenile Death Penalty Is
Disproportionate
The majority then proceeded to the next stage of its inquiry, exercising
its independent judgment to determine whether the death penalty is
inherently disproportionate to even the most heinous offense committed by
a juvenile. 46 The majority reiterated the principle from Atkins that "capital
punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit 'a narrow
category of the most serious crimes' and whose extreme culpability makes
them 'the most deserving of execution."",147  Prior to Roper, under the
Court's earlier precedent, the death penalty could not be imposed even for
some of the most severe crimes, 48 and under no circumstances could
juveniles under sixteen years of age, the insane, and the mentally retarded
be sentenced to death. 149  Even for the limited and well-defined set of
crimes for which the death penalty might be appropriate, a defendant has
"wide latitude to raise as a mitigating factor 'any aspect of his or her
142 Id.
143 Id. at 567. The majority explained that the Senate's prior actions did not prove the
absence of a national consensus against juvenile executions on two grounds. Id. The
majority relied on the fact five states had abandoned the juvenile death penalty since the time
of that treaty, as well as the Federal Death Penalty Act's determination in 1994 that the death
penalty should not extend to juveniles. Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)).
146 Id. at 548.
147 Id. at 568 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319).
148 See id. at 568. These crimes include rape and attempted murder. Id.
149 id.
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character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.' ' 1 50
The majority found three key differences between individuals under
eighteen and adults, which demonstrate that "juvenile offenders cannot with
reliability be classified among the worst offenders."' 51 First, the majority
cited to scientific and sociological studies that confirm what every parent
knows: "[A] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility
are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable
among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-
considered actions and decisions., 152 Referencing studies that found that
"adolescents are overrepresented statistically in virtually every category of
reckless behavior,"'1 53 the majority concluded that it is because of juveniles'
comparative immaturity that almost every state prohibits persons under
eighteen from voting, serving on juries, or marrying. 54  Second, the
majority found that "juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure," because
they do not control their own environment.' 55 Finally, according to the
majority, "the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an
adult. The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed."
156
On account of these differences, the majority found that it is unlikely that
juveniles fall among the worst offenders. 157  Citing various studies that
juveniles' tendency to engage in risky and antisocial behaviors is often
fleeting, the majority concluded that "[f]rom a moral standpoint it would be
misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a
greater possibility exists that a minor's character deficiencies will be
reformed."5 8
Based on its finding that juveniles have diminished culpability, the
majority argued the two penological justifications for the death penalty-
retribution and deterrence-apply to juveniles with lesser force., 59 First,
"[r]etribution is not proportional if the law's most severe penalty is imposed
on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial
1SO Id. (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)).
151 Id.
152 Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
153 Id. (quoting Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescents: A Developmental
Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339 (1992)).
154 Id.
155 Id.
56 Id. at 570.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 569.
159 Id. at 571.
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degree, by reason of youth and immaturity."' 160 Second, while looking to
the question of deterrence, although the Court generally leaves to
legislatures "the assessment of the efficacy of criminal penalty schemes," 161
"the absence of evidence of deterrent effect is of special concern because
the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults
suggest as well that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.' 62 The
majority also noted that life imprisonment for a young person is a
sufficiently severe sanction to obtain the desired deterrent effect.'63
Although the majority recognized the "rare case" where a juvenile may
have sufficient psychological maturity and depravity to merit a death
sentence, it dismissed the argument that jurors should be allowed to
consider mitigating arguments related to youth on a case-by-case basis.
64
Instead, the majority concluded that the "differences between juvenile and
adult offenders are too marked and well understood to risk allowing a
youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient
culpability.' 16 The majority, citing American Psychological Association
rules prohibiting diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder in those under
age eighteen, expressed concern that even expert psychologists may not be
able to "differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects
unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose
crime reflects irreparable corruption. 16 6  Thus, because professional
guidelines limit psychiatrists from diagnosing anti-social personality
disorder in juveniles under eighteen, the majority concluded "that states
should refrain from asking jurors to issue a far graver condemnation - that a
juvenile offender merits the death penalty.'
167
Recognizing the problems with drawing a categorical line at age
eighteen, the majority explained that, although the qualities that distinguish
juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns eighteen,
and although some individuals under eighteen may have sufficient maturity
that other adults will never reach, a line must nevertheless be drawn
because of the indisputable differences between juveniles and adults.
168
Thus, because "[t]he age of [eighteen] is the point where society draws the
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 572.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 572-73.
166 Id. at 573.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 573-74.
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line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood," it is also the age
at which the line for death penalty eligibility should rest.'
69
B. STEVENS' AND GINSBURG'S CONCURRENCE
In a short concurrence, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
used the case as an opportunity to reaffirm the "basic principle" that the
Eighth Amendment must be viewed through an evolutionary framework,
and applied as a mirror of the times.' 70 Otherwise, warned Justice Stevens,
adopting a strict constructionist reading of the Eighth Amendment would
mean that executions of seven-year-olds would be acceptable today.
171
Stevens argued that this is evidence that the meaning of the Constitution
changes with time.
172
C. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS
1. Justice O'Connor's Dissent
Although Justice O'Connor agreed with the legal framework and
general Eighth Amendment principles relied upon by the Court, 7 3 she
disagreed with the Court's application of those principles in this case,
proclaiming that "[n]either the objective evidence of contemporary societal
values, nor the Court's moral proportionality analysis, nor the two in
tandem suffice to justify this ruling."' 174 O'Connor also explicitly affirmed
her view from Atkins that "beyond assessing the actions of legislatures and
juries, the Court has a constitutional obligation to judge for itself whether
capital punishment is a proportionate response to the defendant's
blameworthiness."1
75
a. National Consensus
O'Connor first examined whether a national consensus truly existed in
this case, and found that the "objective evidence of national consensus is
169 Id. at 574.
170 Id. at 587 (Stevens, J., concurring).
171 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, the
common law established "the rebuttable presumption of incapacity to commit any felony at
the age of [fourteen], and theoretically permitted capital punishment to be imposed on
anyone over the age of [seven]." Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368 (1989).
172 Roper, 543 U.S. at 587 (Stevens, J., concurring).
173 Id. at 588-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
174 Id. at 587 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
171 Id. at 592 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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marginally weaker here." 176  Unlike in Atkins, where the state laws
indicated zero affirmative legislative support for the practice of executing
mentally retarded persons, here eight states specifically set the age for death
penalty eligibility at sixteen or seventeen in their laws. 177 This legislative
agenda, combined with the facts that 1) five of these eight states currently
had juvenile offenders on death row, 2) four of these eight states had
executed juvenile offenders within the past fifteen years, and 3) over
seventy juvenile offenders were on death row, cumulatively suggested
"some measure of continuing public support for the availability of the death
penalty for [seventeen]-year-old capital murderers. 1 78 O'Connor was also
troubled by the absence of the "extraordinary wave of legislative action
leading up to our decision in Atkins," concluding that the "halting pace of
change gives reason for pause.' 79 O'Connor concluded that "[h]ere, as in
Atkins, the objective evidence of a national consensus is weaker than in
most prior cases in which the Court has struck down a particular
punishment under the Eighth Amendment." 180  However, O'Connor
indicated that the absence of a clear national consensus is not dispositive
and that the Court's independent proportionality analysis is the proper
decisive factor.1
8'
b. Independent Analysis of Whether the Juvenile Death Penalty Is
Disproportionate
O'Connor argued that "the proportionality argument against the
juvenile death penalty is so flawed that it can be given little, if any,
analytical weight-it proves too weak to resolve the lingering ambiguities
in the objective evidence of legislative consensus or to justify the Court's
categorical rule."' 82 Although O'Connor recognized that it is "beyond cavil
that juveniles as a class are generally less mature, less responsible, and less
fully formed than adults, and that these differences bear on juveniles'
comparative moral culpability," she claimed that these differences fail to
176 Id. at 595 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 596-97 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Of the states with statutes specifically
setting the age for death penalty eligibility at sixteen or seventeen, four had passed statutes
within the previous two years (Texas in 2003, Virginia in 2003, North Carolina in 2003, and
Nevada in 2003) and the remaining states had statutes passed within the previous nine years.
(New Hampshire in 1996, Missouri in 1999, and Kentucky in 1999). See id. at 579-80
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (Appendix A).
178 Id. at 596 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
179 Id. at 597 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
180 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
181 Id. at 598 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
182 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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support the categorical rule that no sixteen or seventeen-year-olds may be
morally accountable for their actions.' 
83
O'Connor contended that the majority provided no support for its
"sweeping conclusion" that it is only in "rare" cases that a seventeen-year-
old might be sufficiently mature and depraved to warrant the death
penalty. 184 O'Connor claimed that simply because most seventeen-year-
olds may not be sufficiently mature to warrant the death penalty, it does not
follow that all seventeen-year-olds are so immature that the death penalty is
inherently disproportionate. 85 Likewise, the deterrent effect of the death
penalty for at least some seventeen-year-olds offenders cannot be
dismissed. 86 Furthermore, although there is some age at which no offender
can be deemed to have the cognitive and emotional maturity to warrant the
death penalty, the case of seventeen-year-olds is "at the margins" and thus it
"follows that a legislature may reasonably conclude that at least some
[seventeen]-year-olds can act with sufficient moral culpability, and can be
sufficiently deterred by the threat of execution, that capital punishment may
be warranted."' 187 Accordingly, the jury was entitled to find that, despite
Simmons' youth, he had sufficient maturity to warrant the death penalty
based on the extreme cruelty of the crime and the fact he felt he could "get
away with it" because he was not yet eighteen-years-old.18 8 According to
O'Connor, the "class of offenders exempted from capital punishment by
today's decision is too broad and too diverse to warrant a categorical
prohibition."' 189 For O'Connor, the decision would protect many sixteen
and seventeen-year-old offenders who are mature enough to warrant the
death penalty. 90 O'Connor also distinguished mentally retarded persons
from immature seventeen-year-olds, arguing that although seventeen-year-
olds may be less mature than adults on average, it "defies common sense to
suggest [seventeen]-year-olds as a class are somehow equivalent to
mentally retarded persons with regard to culpability or susceptibility to
deterrence."'91
183 Id. at 599 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
184 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
185 Id. at 599-600 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
186 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
187 Id. at 600 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
188 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
189 Id. at 601 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
190 Id. at 601-02 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
191 Id. at 602 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor argued that a mentally
retarded person is "by definition" a person who lacks the basic cognitive skills to be held
fully culpable for their actions. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). A juvenile, on the other hand,
may on average be less mature than an adult, but that "lesser maturity simply cannot be
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O'Connor also criticized the majority for providing zero evidence that
sentencing juries cannot "accurately evaluate a youthful offender's maturity
or give appropriate weight to the mitigating characteristics related to
youth."1 92  Noting that the majority failed to explain why this duty is
different from any other capital sentencing factor, O'Connor explained "I
would not be so quick to conclude that the constitutional safeguards, the
sentencing juries, and the trial judges upon which we place so much
reliance in all capital cases are inadequate in this narrow context."
1 93
2. Justice Scalia's Dissent
a. National Consensus
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas,
began his dissent by delineating the modem (although, in his opinion,
erroneous1 94) framework of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, which he
viewed as looking at whether there is a "national consensus" that laws
allowing certain punishments violate contemporary "standards of
decency." 195 Scalia argued that the majority's case for a national consensus,
consisting of eighteen states, or forty-seven percent of all death penalty
equated with the major, lifelong impairments suffered by the mentally retarded." Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). O'Connor contended "[t]here is no such inherent or accurate fit
between an offender's chronological age and the personal limitations which the Court
believes make capital punishment excessive for [seventeen]-year-old murderers." Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
192 Id. at 603 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
193 Id. at 603-04 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
194 In a footnote, Justice Scalia proffered his view that the sole inquiry for determining
whether a punishment is cruel and unusual is whether it is one of the "modes or acts of
punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was
adopted." Id. at 609 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,
405 (1986)). Scalia also criticized the majority's failure to reprimand the Missouri Supreme
Court for independently reevaluating the precedent established in Stanford, but suggested the
flawed framework of the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence explained the
insubordination:
The lower courts can look into that mirror as well as we can; and what we saw [fifteen] years ago
bears no necessary relationship to what they see today. Since they are not looking at the same
text, but a different scene, why should our earlier decision control their judgment?
Id. at 629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
For Scalia, the entire scheme of modem Eighth Amendment jurisprudence illustrates the
fundamental problems with the theory that the meaning of laws evolve over time, because
the practice "destroys stability and makes our case law an unreliable basis for the designing
of laws by citizens and their representatives, and for action by public officials." Id. at 630
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
19' Id. at 608-09 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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states, against the juvenile death penalty is inadequate under the Court's
precedent. 196  "Words have no meaning if the views of less than [fifty
percent] of death penalty States can constitute a national consensus."',
97
Scalia explained that "[o]ur previous cases have required overwhelming
opposition to a challenged practice, generally over a long period of time." 98
These indicia were based on "objective indicia that reflect the public
attitude toward a given sanction" in the form of "statutes passed by
society's elected representatives."'
99
According to Scalia, the majority's attempt to incorporate the views of
non-death penalty states was a "new method of counting" akin to "including
old-order Amishmen in a consumer-preference poll on the electric car.,
200
Scalia argued that the majority's reliance on the views of the twelve states
prohibiting all capital punishment is misplaced because a state's general
prohibition against the death penalty does not speak to the question of
whether those states adopt the view that juveniles are so immature and
reckless as to justify a categorical rule against their execution. 20 1 "That
[twelve] States favor no executions says something about consensus against
the death penalty, but nothing-absolutely nothing-about consensus that
offenders under [eighteen] deserve special immunity from such a
penalty., 20 2 Scalia posited that these twelve states do not adopt the views
regarding juvenile culpability ascribed to them by the majority because all
twelve permitted juveniles to be treated as adults for non-capital offenses.2 3
Justice Scalia also attacked the more nuanced indicia of consensus
relied upon by the majority.2°4 First, Scalia noted that only four states
actually changed their laws to prohibit juvenile executions post-Stanford,
unlike the sixteen states which changed their laws in the buildup to
Atkins.2°5 Second, two states that were supposedly members of the
consensus against the juvenile death penalty, Missouri and Virginia,
actually passed legislation after Stanford establishing sixteen as the age for
death penalty eligibility, and Florida and Arizona (which were also in the
consensus against the death penalty according to the majority) passed ballot
196 Id. at 608-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
197 Id. at 609 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
198 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989)).
200 Id. at 6 10-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
201 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
202 Id. at 611 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
203 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
204 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
205 Id. at 609 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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initiatives to the same effect.2°6 This legislative action, said Scalia, is direct
evidence of popular support for capital punishment of sixteen and
seventeen-year-olds since Stanford. °7 Third, Scalia claimed that the
infrequency of juvenile executions reflects jurors' reluctance to impose the
death penalty on juveniles, but does not signify society's disavowal of the
practice as the majority claims.2 °8 Finally, Scalia attacked the majority's
assertion that the number of juvenile executions had dropped over recent
years by presenting statistical evidence that juvenile executions have
actually held steady or increased when adjusted for the total number of all
executions. 20 9 Thus, Justice Scalia found no substantive evidence for the
majority's "implausible assertion of national consensus," noting that all the
Court had done was to flagrantly bolster its own position while ignoring
contrarian evidence, or to "look over the heads of the crowd and pick out its
friends. 21°
b. Independent Analysis of Whether the Juvenile Death Penalty Is
Disproportionate
Justice Scalia then turned to what he considers "the real force driving
today's decision," the majority's independent judgment that the death
penalty for juveniles is inherently disproportionate.211 Justice Scalia argued
that the majority's purported pre-Stanford standard, which allowed the
Court to execute its independent judgment about whether a punishment is
proportionate, was unsound because no prior case law had ever held that the
Court's judgment could be used to supplant a national consensus. 212 Scalia
claimed that the notion of independent judicial review is fundamentally
incompatible with the Court's jurisprudence that the Eighth Amendment is
"an ever-changing reflection of the 'evolving standards of decency,"' noting
"it makes no sense for the Justices then to prescribe those standards rather
than discern them from the practices of our people. 21 3 Scalia also argued
206 Id. at 613-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Roper majority included Missouri and
Virginia in its national consensus because neither state lowered the age required for death
penalty eligibility. See id. at 613 (Scalia, J., dissenting). According to Scalia, for the
majority, change was defined to reflect only those laws explicitly reducing the age for death
penalty eligibility, excluding laws that altered but nevertheless reinforced support for the
juvenile death penalty. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
207 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
208 Id. at 614 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
209 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
210 Id. at 617 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
211 Id. at 615 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
212 Id. at 615-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
213 Id. at 616 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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that the majority's decision is illustrative of the fact that reliance on
sociological and scientific data is prone to bias and self-selection.214 For
example, Scalia referred to the American Psychological Association's claim
that scientific evidence shows persons under eighteen lack the ability to
take moral responsibility for their decisions, yet presented another
statement from the American Psychological Association, in a previous case
before the Supreme Court, where the group claimed that scientific research
showed that juveniles were mature enough to make moral decisions such as
whether to obtain an abortion without parental involvement. 215  Justice
Scalia claimed that this inconsistency is illustrative of the fact that courts
are inherently ill-suited to determine which scientific data to believe, and
thus, these decisions ought to be left to the legislature. z 6 Scalia further
noted, notwithstanding his concerns regarding the potential problems with
the studies' methodology,217 the conclusions of the studies offered by the
majority only indicate that on average persons under eighteen are unable to
take full moral responsibility for their actions.21 8 For Scalia, this broad
conclusion does not justify the Court's finding that legislatures and juries
cannot treat exceptional cases with exceptional punishment, particularly
where there is a finding of sufficient maturity and culpability, as was the
case with Christopher Simmons' pre-meditated murder.21 9
Scalia also contended that the majority cannot put much weight in the
fact that juveniles under eighteen are not treated as full adults by society.
For Justice Scalia, the basic understanding that killing another person is
wrong is much less sophisticated than making the decision to get married or
220serving on a jury. Moreover, Scalia noted that the Court has found
juveniles competent to make moral decisions in the context of abortion,
214 Id. at 617 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
216 Id. at 617-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217 Justice Scalia is concerned that the studies relied upon by the majority were never
tested in an adversarial proceeding or otherwise proven to be methodologically sound.
Justice Scalia cites the view of Chief Justice Rehnquist, explaining that:
[M]ethodological and other errors can affect the reliability and validity of estimates about the
opinions and attitudes of a population derived from various sampling techniques. Everything
from variations in the survey methodology, such as the choice of the target population, the
sampling design used, the questions asked, and the statistical analyses used to interpret the data
can skew the results.
Id. at 617 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 326-27 (2002)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)).
211 Id. at 617-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
219 Id. at 619 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
220 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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which is surely a more nuanced moral question than knowing whether it is
221wrong to kill a person.
Scalia also expressed doubt that juries cannot be trusted to impartially
weigh a defendant's youth in sentencing proceedings due to the heinous
122nature of a crime. According to Scalia, there is no evidence to support
the majority's contention that juries are unable to adequately incorporate
youth into their sentencing decisions.223 In fact, the comparatively lower
number of juvenile death sentences is a testament to the fact that juries
employ significant restraint in sentencing juveniles to death.224 Scalia
further argued that there is no logical stopping point to the majority's line of
reasoning because if juries are unable to reasonably account for age, then
the same general bias would also prevent a fair evaluation of the mitigating
effects of poverty, childhood abuse, or other similar factors.22 5 Under such
a reading, the Eighth Amendment would require removing almost all
sentencing discretion from biased jurors.226
Justice Scalia argued that Roper was a perfect example that the
deterrence rationale works in the case of juveniles because part of the
reason Simmons committed the crime was because he thought he could "get
227away with it" due to his young age. Moreover, Scalia argued that the
majority's conclusion that retribution is inherently disproportionate puts the
carriage before the horse, so to speak, because it assumes away the
underlying question of whether the offender may have sufficient culpability
to warrant the death penalty, as undoubtedly some offenders do.228 Justice
Scalia ultimately concluded that the majority simply interjected its "own
judgment that murderers younger than [eighteen] can never be as morally
culpable as older counterparts. 229
V. ANALYSIS
The decision in Roper is flawed for two reasons. First, the Court's
rationale for a national consensus is significantly weaker than in all of its
previous cases. Second, the Court's interjection of its subjective judgment
becomes the overriding variable in determining what constitutes cruel and
221 Id. at 620 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
222 Id. at 620-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
223 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
224 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
225 Id. at 621 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see supra Part IV.B.
226 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
227 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
228 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
229 Id. at 615 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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unusual punishment. Combined, these developments effectively obliterate
any cognizable foundation for interpreting the scope of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
A. THE CONSENSUS CONUNDRUM
Although Roper appears to comport with the general framework of
prior Eighth Amendment jurisprudence by focusing on whether there is a
national consensus against the juvenile death penalty, the decision breaks
from earlier cases by dramatically lowering the threshold of proof
previously demanded by the Court to establish such a consensus. As in
prior cases, the Roper majority purports to focus its inquiry on the objective
indicia of society's standards, such as legislative enactments and state
practice. However, the evidence relied upon by the majority in Roper
supporting its contention that there was a national consensus against the
juvenile death penalty was significantly less forceful than in virtually all of
its previous cases. The Court's consensus analysis focused on three issues:
state enactment, frequency of punishment, and the direction of change
among state laws. Ultimately, however, the majority's reasoning fails to
demonstrate a clear consensus against the juvenile death penalty.
1. State Enactments
First, the Court placed significance on the fact that thirty states did not
permit the juvenile death penalty. However, as Justice Scalia explained in
his dissent, this "majority" was misleading because twelve of those thirty
states banned the death penalty entirely. Accordingly, it could not be
presumed that those twelve states adopted the view that persons under
eighteen were inherently less culpable for their crimes. ° Scalia argued
that because all twelve of the non-death penalty states permit or require
juvenile offenders to be treated as adults for non-capital offenses, it
followed that they did not share the beliefs ascribed to them by the majority
that all sixteen and seventeen-year-olds have lower culpability, are
inherently reckless, and possess a lack of capacity for considered
judgment.231
230 Id. at 610-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Stanford, Scalia explained that counting death
penalty states is "rather like discerning a national consensus that wagering on cockfights is
inhumane by counting within that consensus those States that bar all wagering." Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 371 (1989).
231 Every non-death penalty jurisdiction except for the District of Columbia permits
seventeen year-olds (and frequently those younger than seventeen) accused of a felony to be
tried as adults. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.030 (LexisNexis 2002) (permitting sixteen-
year-olds to be tried as adults); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-22 (1999) (permitting sixteen-year-
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Moreover, of states with the death penalty, only forty-seven percent
banned the death sentence for juveniles, putting anti-juvenile death penalty
states in the minority among death penalty states. Nevertheless, the
majority found that the fact that twelve states barred all death sentences
constituted evidence that the citizens of those states believed imposing the
death penalty on juveniles was cruel and unusual. Nowhere, however, does
the majority elucidate how a state's general prohibition against the death
penalty equates with the view that juveniles, as a class, are particularly ill-
suited for the death penalty on account of their immaturity. Indeed, as
Justice Scalia aptly points out, "[nione of our cases dealing with an alleged
constitutional limitation upon the death penalty has counted, as States
supporting a consensus in favor of that limitation, States that have
eliminated the death penalty entirely. 2 32 Based on the fact that all twelve
of the non-death penalty states permit seventeen-year-olds (and often
persons younger than seventeen) to be tried as adults for felony offenses
and sanctioned with the state's most severe penalty, it is clear that these
states do not believe that juveniles are never deserving of the most severe
penalties. The fact that these states do not permit the death penalty
illustrates only a belief concerning the upward bound of acceptable
punishment for all offenders. The objective indicia, as expressed through
legislative enactments, clearly reflect the view of these twelve states that
juveniles are sometimes sufficiently culpable to warrant the most severe
punishment available.233 Nevertheless, the Roper majority interpreted the
olds to be tried as adults); IOWA CODE § 232.45 (2003) (permitting fourteen-year-olds to be
tried as adults); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3101(4) (West 2003) (permitting juveniles
under eighteen to be tried as adults); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 74 (West 2003)
(permitting seventeen-year-olds to be tried as adults); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 764.27
(West 2000) (permitting seventeen-year-olds to be tried as adults); MINN. STAT. § 260B.125
(2002) (permitting fourteen-year-olds to be tried as adults); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34
(2003) (permitting fourteen-year-olds to be tried as adults); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-7 (2002)
(permitting sixteen-year-olds to be tried as adults); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5516 (2001)
(permitting fourteen-year-olds to be tried as adults); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-10 (2004)
(permitting fourteen-year-olds to be tried as adults); WIS. STAT. § 938.18 (2003-2004)
(permitting fourteen-year-olds to be tried as adults). More importantly, however, every state
in the nation exposes juveniles to the risk of being subjected to the state's harshest adult
criminal sanctions. See NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, TRYING AND SENTENCING
JUVENILES AS ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER AND BLENDED SENTENCING LAWS
(2003), available at http://ncjj.servehttp.com/NCJJWebsite/pdf/transferbulletin.pdf Alaska,
Minnesota, North Dakota, and Rhode Island mandate adult sentencing for juveniles tried as
adults. Id.
232 Roper, 543 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
233 See supra note 231.
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twelve states prohibition of the death penalty as an indication that juveniles
never deserve the most severe punishment available.234
Thus, for the first time, the Court in Roper concluded that a state could
be presumed to oppose a specific practice despite the absence of laws that
directly prohibited the practice in question. 235  This development is
disturbing because it empowers the Court to extrapolate viewpoints not
firmly rooted in the "objective indicia of contemporary values," such as
legislative enactments and state practice.236 Indeed, this trend undermines
the central reason why the Court looks to objective indicia to measure
consensus: to obtain an accurate depiction of society's views towards a
punishment. If state laws are interpreted as fast and loose as in Roper,
those laws are no longer an accurate indication of consensus towards a
punishment, and the entire Eighth Amendment national consensus scheme
is fundamentally a hollow inquiry.
2. Frequency of the Punishment
Second, the majority claimed that the practice of executing juveniles
had become infrequent because only six states had executed prisoners for
crimes committed as juveniles since Stanford, and this was proof of a
consensus against the juvenile death penalty. However, prior cases
uncovering a national consensus always involved a severe and pronounced
decrease in the frequency of the punishment. For example, in Atkins, the
Court observed that only five mentally retarded individuals had been
executed since the practice had been affirmed in Penry.237 In Roper, on the
other hand, there was no substantive statistical evidence pointing to a
decrease in the imposition of the death penalty towards juveniles. Indeed,
the number of juvenile offenders subjected to the death penalty had actually
slightly increased since Stanford.238 Additionally, unlike in prior cases such
as Atkins and Coker v. Georgia (where the number of offenders sentenced
to the punishment and states that permitted the punishment could
simultaneously be counted on one hand), there were "currently over seventy
juvenile offenders on death row in twelve different states (thirteen including
234 In Atkins, on the other hand, the laws of the thirty states prohibiting the execution of
the mentally retarded were explicit recognitions of the belief mentally retarded persons were
less deserving of the death penalty. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
235 In Atkins, the state laws were directly on point, specifically prohibiting the execution
of mentally retarded persons. Id. at 313-15.
236 Id. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
237 Id. at 316.
238 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 531, 615 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that
juveniles constituted 2.0% of all executions at the time of Stanford and 2.4% of all
executions at the time of Roper).
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the respondent)., 239 Nevertheless, the majority concluded that the practice
of executing prisoners for crimes committed as juveniles was
"infrequent., 240 Accordingly, the threshold for the Court to determine that a
particular punishment was infrequent was dramatically shortened in Roper,
and now appears to demand significantly less quantitative proof than in
earlier decisions.
Another problem with relying on frequency as a measurement of
consensus is that the limited number of death penalty sentences for
juveniles may be a reflection of a juror's tendency to see youth as a
mitigating factor, and their feelings that the death penalty should be
imposed only on the most culpable juveniles. Indeed, the reason the Court
looked at the frequency of a punishment's imposition was because the jury
"is a significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values
because it is so directly involved.",24' The possibility that a jury may
selectively impose the juvenile death penalty only in rare instances where it
has made a determination that a juvenile is especially depraved makes it
difficult to separate from a more generalized trend that society inherently
disapproves of the juvenile death penalty. Thus, although it would appear
that frequency would only be instructive where there is a clear indication
that the punishment is truly unusual, as in Atkins, the Roper majority
nevertheless found it to be substantive proof of a national consensus.
3. Consistent Direction of Change
Finally, the majority put weight on the consistent direction of change
in the laws of the states towards abolishing the juvenile death penalty. The
majority argued that the trend towards prohibiting the juvenile death
penalty was evidenced by the fact that five states had abandoned the
239 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976). Alabama, with fourteen juveniles on
death row, and Texas, with twenty-nine juveniles on death row, account for over half of all
juveniles on death row. See Victor Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today: Death
Sentences and Executions for Juvenile Crimes, January 1, 1973-December 31, 2004, Jan. 31,
2005, at 4, http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/documents/JuvDeathDec2004.pdf (last
updated Jan. 31, 2005). However, the remaining number of juvenile death sentences was
well distributed among the remaining states with the juvenile death penalty. Id. (Arizona:
four, Florida: three, Georgia: two, Louisiana: four, Mississippi: five, Nevada: one, North
Carolina: four, Pennsylvania: two, South Carolina: three, Virginia: one).
240 Prior to Roper, it appeared a practice was infrequent if, as in Coker, only six
individuals within one state have received the sentence. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
596 (1977). However, after Roper, it appears that a practice is infrequent even if twenty-two
individuals across six states have had their sentence carried out. Streib, supra note 239, at 4.
It is unclear at what point or on what grounds the Court will determine that a practice
remains frequent.
241 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181.
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practice since it was upheld in Stanford fifteen years earlier. 42 In Roper,
the direct indicators of a national consensus were weak in comparison to
Atkins, which had pushed the envelope in arguing that a consensus was
formed by only eighteen states passing laws prohibiting execution of the
mentally retarded.243 In Roper, a mere five states had prohibited the
juvenile death penalty since Stanford. However, for the majority, the main
issue was "not so much the number of these States that [was] significant,
but ... the direction of change." 2 " The majority emphasized the fact that
no state that previously permitted the juvenile death penalty had reinstated
it, and that no state had lowered the age for death penalty eligibility.
However, the majority overlooked the four states that had expressly
reaffirmed their support for the juvenile death penalty through legislation
and votes expressly setting the age for death penalty eligibility at sixteen. 245
This situation was distinct from Atkins, where there was "virtually no
countervailing evidence of affirmative legislative support for this
,,246practice.
The majority's inquiry in Roper failed to fully examine the landscape
of society's attitudes and the states' legislative enactments on the question
of the juvenile death penalty. Nevertheless, the majority reasoned that the
slower pace of abolition of the juvenile death penalty was counterbalanced
by the consistent direction of the change. Roper significantly cuts back on
the weight of the criteria that the Court previously demanded to establish a
national consensus, finding that only five states changing course in their
laws signified an evolution in society's standards of decency, while
242 Four states abandoned the practice by legislation, one state by judicial opinion. Scalia
argued that the accurate number for a national consensus should actually be four states
because the prohibition of the juvenile death penalty in the fifth state, Washington, was
simply a judicial decision that attempted to avoid constitutional issues by construing the law
narrowly, and did not purport to reflect popular sentiment. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 612
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
243 Atkins was weaker compared to its precedent cases because its consensus majority
consisted of only eighteen states that had abolished the death penalty for the mentally
retarded. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314 (2002). Earlier cases, such as Stanford, had
found that even twenty-seven out of thirty-seven states banning the execution of seventeen-
year-olds was insufficient to establish a national consensus. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989).
244 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 566 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315).
245 It appears the Court interpreted "change" narrowly to reflect only those laws
explicitly reducing the age for death penalty eligibility, excluding laws that altered but
nevertheless reinforced support for the juvenile death penalty. Accordingly, states that
previously had no minimum age for death eligibility and after Stanford formally established
sixteen as the minimum age for death eligibility were not included in its calculus.
246 Roper, 543 U.S. at 594 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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simultaneously ignoring actions taken by other states moving in the
opposite direction.
Cumulatively, the evidence of a national consensus was significantly
weaker in Roper than in previous Eighth Amendment cases. Post-Roper, it
is now necessary only to convince the Court that a combination of three
weakened indicia exists. First, the Court may be convinced of a national
consensus if a majority of state laws suggest disavowal of a particular form
of punishment, even if the punishment is generally prohibited for some
broader purpose other than its cruelty or unusualness. Second, the Court
will consider the frequency with which a given punishment is used, with the
new benchmark that a practice permitted in eight states and imposed over
seventy times is nevertheless infrequent. Third, as long as some
measurement of a change in the direction of state laws is consistent, the
Court will view it as an indication of a national consensus, even if as few as
two or three states are responsible for the change.
By shrinking the indicia necessary to mount a claim that standards of
decency have evolved, Roper removes the major substantive obstacle that
has traditionally put a temporal distance between Eighth Amendment cases.
The decision makes it increasingly likely that the Eighth Amendment will
continue to accelerate in its development, both in terms of the frequency
with which cases are litigated and the mechanisms used to measure
society's evolving standards. The lowered threshold will result in
instability in the law because questions of national consensus will be
reconsidered more frequently due to the lower burden of proof necessary to
initiate a claim that a given punishment has exceeded modem standards.
Indeed, the three indicia used in Roper to signify a national consensus could
be met exceedingly quickly; in Roper, the changes in state laws relied upon
by Simmons occurred entirely within the previous five years.
Theoretically, Eighth Amendment law could be changing as frequently as
the Court can be persuaded that standards of decency have shifted.
4. Problems with the National Consensus Framework
a. Sloppy Social Science
A major criticism of the Court's national consensus framework is the
Court's reliance on imprecise and incomplete gauges to measure society's
standards of decency.247 In Roper, the Court's objective indicia of
247 Norman J. Finkel, Is Justice Just Us? A Symposium on the Use of Social Science to
Inform the Substantive Criminal Law: Commonsense Justice, Culpability, and Punishment,
28 HOFSTRA L. REv. 669, 682 (2000).
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consensus looked only to legislative enactments and jury decisions.
However, according to Professor Norman Finkel, "[i]n the end, the
Supreme Court's social science analysis does not withstand social science
scrutiny., 248  Indeed, "[t]he Supreme Court's social science analysis in
these death penalty cases takes on the appearance of a food fight, where the
Justices hammer one another in footnotes hurling accusations of
prestidigitation, statistical magic, and numerology., 249 Finkel suggests that
a truly objective analysis, which is allegedly what the Court proposes,
"requires that the social scientist gather, categorize, and analyze all relevant
data that bear on the question at bar., 250  This inquiry would expand to
opinion polls, mock juries, and anything that might produce useful data to
measure social consensus.2 5 1  "There is no defense, on social science
grounds, for an a priori restriction of the data and the gauges that produce
data.
, 252
The first indicator relied upon by the Court, state laws, are admittedly
not an unfettered reflection of society's views.253 It is true that "legislative
enactments may reflect community sentiment, perceived community
sentiment, perceived Supreme Court sentiment, or some confluence of all of
those influences. 254 Thus, although legislators do not "weigh all political
winds equally,, 255 lawmakers are politically accountable and, for
constitutional purposes, are presumed to represent the views of the
citizenry. The Court's reliance on legislative enactments is rooted in the
democratic presumption that the legislature ultimately expresses the will of
the people. As Justice Rehnquist explained in Atkins, "[t]he reason we
ascribe primacy to legislative enactments follows from the constitutional
role legislatures play in expressing the policy of a State. 'In a democratic
society, legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and
consequently the moral values of the people.' 256 Thus, although the laws
of the states are inevitably politically filtered, they are an appropriate
indication of society's views because they are objectively measurable.
It is also correct that jury decisions, the second indicator relied upon
by the Court, are not a perfect representation of community sentiment
248 Id.
249 Norman J. Finkel, Prestidigitation, Statistical Magic, and the Supreme Court
Numerology in Juvenile Death Penalty Cases, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 612, 623 (1995).
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 622.
255 Id.
256 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 323 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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because, in the aggregate, jury decisions do not elicit the conclusion that
age was the key variable leading in a jury's decision regarding the death
penalty. 57 Nevertheless, jury decisions can be used to answer the basic
question for which the Court uses the data, which is whether the juvenile
death penalty is frequently imposed in proportion to its historical use,
adjusted relative to overall death sentences. The numbers alone objectively
quantify the frequency of a given punishment, which goes directly to the
issue of whether it is falling out of favor within society.
Putting aside the question of whether the Court's national consensus
framework is the proper way to interpret the Eighth Amendment, the fact
remains that this framework is not going to disappear. Operating under the
modem framework, the flawed gauges relied upon by the Court are the best
and only objective indicia that can be independently evaluated by the Court,
without reducing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to a battlefield of social
science methodologies. The Court is correct to exclude other available
indicia of consensus, such as opinion polls and mock studies.258  The
intricacies of these other gauges, and even more comprehensive (and
therefore sophisticated) analyses of the two sanctioned indicia, put the
Court in the position of having to select among competing social science
methodologies. The two indicators relied upon by the Court-legislative
enactments and jury decision data-are not proclaimed to withstand an
onslaught of social science criticism. Rather, these indicators are employed
because they are the only unambiguous indicators of consensus that can be
objectively measured without forcing the Court to delve into the realm of
academic refereeing for which it is so ill-qualified.
5 9
b. Devolving Standards of Decency
An overlooked issue in the Court's Eighth Amendment framework is
that it is not necessarily the case that a maturing society will always
progressively mature in its standards of decency. 260 None of the Court's
257 Finkel, supra note 249, at 622-23.
258 Id. at 623. Fluid indicators such as polls and mock studies are open to dispute
regarding methodology, as well as the potential for bias. For example, imagine the public
outcry if the Court cited a Fox News poll and ignored a competing CNN poll reaching a
different conclusion. Clearly, the Court has no unique sensory apparatus enabling it to make
conclusive judgments regarding the accuracy and impartiality of polls and other fluid
measurements of public opinion.
259 See supra note 217.
260 See Emily Marie Moeller, Devolving Standards of Decency: Using the Death Penalty
to Punish Child Rapists, 102 DICK. L. REv. 621 (1996); Consuelo Alden Vasquez,
Prometheus Rebound by the Devolving Standards of Decency: The Resurrection of the Chain
Gang, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 221 (1995).
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Eighth Amendment cases suggests that standards of decency have a
ratcheting effect, such that they can evolve but never devolve. However,
the Court's continued reliance on a national consensus scheme overlooks
the likelihood that society's standards of decency may devolve. For
example, in 1995, Louisiana passed a law permitting the death penalty for
anyone convicted of raping a child under age twelve. 26' The law directly
challenged the Supreme Court's holding in Coker v. Georgia that a death
sentence was a disproportionate punishment for the crime of rape, and
therefore cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
262
Nevertheless, the following year, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the
law as constitutional, affirming the death sentence of two men convicted for
raping five-year-ods.263 The Louisiana Supreme Court found that capital
punishment was justified for child rapists, because of the appalling nature
of raping a child and the harm inflicted upon the child and society.264 The
Louisiana Supreme Court recognized:
While Louisiana is the only state that permits the death penalty for the rape of a child
less than twelve, it is difficult to believe that it will remain alone in punishing rape by
death if the years ahead demonstrate a drastic reduction in the incidence of child rape,
an increase in cooperation by rape victims in the apprehension and prosecution of
rapists, and a greater confidence in the role of law on the part of the people. This
experience will be a consideration for this and other states' legislatures.
The Louisiana law has not yet worked its way to the Supreme Court.
However, if it does, the law seems unlikely to survive the national
consensus prong of the Court's modem Eighth Amendment test because
Louisiana, as the sole state advocating the death penalty for child rapists,
will remain outside what the Court has previously deemed to be the national
consensus.
Any state that takes the first step in passing a new law is by definition
outside whatever the Court most recently found to be the current national
consensus. Therefore, a maverick state, such as Louisiana, is immediately
forced to rebut the presumption that the practice violates established Eighth
Amendment precedent. Even if a majority of states and society
overwhelmingly support the restoration of a given punishment, it would be
virtually impossible for the states to make a coordinated effort to bring a
given punishment back into the mainstream before it would be struck down
as outside the national consensus. As the Louisiana Supreme Court noted,
261 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(c) (1997).
262 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
263 State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063 (La. 1996).
264 Id. at 1070.
261 Id. at 1073.
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"[i]f no state could pass a law without other states passing the same or
similar law, new laws could never be passed.
266
This dilemma demonstrates the finality of a finding by the Supreme
Court that a given punishment is cruel and unusual. Even if society
reconsiders its standards or if the Court was incorrect in its assessment of
society's standards, a previous finding of a national consensus against a
given punishment will override the accurate modem standards. As Justice
O'Connor explained in Thompson v. Oklahoma, when the Court considered
the constitutionality of the death penalty in Furman v. Georgia, "any
inference of a societal consensus rejecting the death penalty would have
been mistaken. 267  Indeed, if the Court had prematurely "declared the
existence of such a consensus, and outlawed capital punishment,
legislatures would very likely not have been able to revive it. The mistaken
premise of the decision would have been frozen into constitutional law,
making it difficult to refute and even more difficult to reject. 268
Deference to yesterday's standards of decency is inconsistent with the
framework relied upon by the Court. In the words of Professor Finkel,
"[c]urrent is key, because society's standards evolve, and current
community sentiment is central in the Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. 2 69 As the Louisiana Supreme Court correctly recognized,
the purposes for which the Court affirmed the death penalty--deterrence
and retribution-would likely be furthered by Louisiana's child rape death
penalty law.270 Accordingly, because the death penalty is constitutionally
permissible, under the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, it should
be permitted in those instances where it makes a measurable contribution to
the goals it purports to accomplish and where it is within the realm of
punishments not deemed cruel and unusual by society. If the Court's
framework opts to look at society to determine standards of decency, then
those modem standards ought to be brought to bear, even if they constitute
a step backwards in the eyes of the Justices.
Thus, it appears, rather ironically, that modem standards of decency do
not necessarily reflect modem society's viewpoints, but more likely mirror
the highest standards held by society in any preceding time period.
266 Id. at 1069.
267 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 855 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring). After
Furman invalidated the death penalty in 1972 because of problems with its arbitrary
imposition, thirty-eight states revised their death penalty laws to conform to the Court's
mandate in Furman, and once again permitted the death penalty. Id. (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)
268 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
269 Finkel, supra note 249, at 617.
270 Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1073.
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Because the Court is no longer bound to the principle laid out in Coker that
"judgment should be informed by objective factors to the maximum
,,271possible extent, it is increasingly likely that the decisions of a majority
of the Court will eternally condemn punishments as cruel and unusual,
permanently limiting the means with which society can decide to punish
those convicted of the most heinous crimes. Arguably, the reduced
threshold for a national consensus in Roper could mean that the indicia
would reflect a devolving standard of decency quicker than before.
However, it is unlikely that the Court will view "evolving standards of
decency" as a two-way street. Once a punishment is deemed to be outside
the consensus, even numerous states moving in the opposite direction will
face an uphill battle in proving that the trend will continue. Additionally, a
reemerging punishment will likely be imposed infrequently for particularly
rare and egregious crimes, making it particularly difficult for a state to
refute the Court's construct that infrequency is indicative of unpopularity.272
For example, most Louisiana jurors may choose not to execute all child
rapists, just like most juries did not choose to execute juvenile murderers,
even if the state laws permitted it. Finally, and most critically, the Court's
independent judgment will also likely overwhelm any signs of a national
consensus suggesting devolving standards. Indeed, it appears that in Roper,
the majority selectively utilized the national consensus analysis only so
long as it was useful to support its independent findings of proportionality.
As evidenced in Roper, the question of proportionality is truly the driving
force behind the Court's decision.
B. PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS
The Roper Court broke significantly from its decision in Stanford by
explicitly utilizing its independent judgment to conclude that the juvenile
death penalty is cruel and unusual. In Stanford, the Court explained that
while "several of our cases have engaged in so-called 'proportionality'
analysis ... we have never invalidated a punishment on this basis alone.,
273
Rather, it was only when objective indicia invalidated a punishment that
this inquiry was brought to light.274 The view that the Court's independent
judgment should not be determinative was expressed in earlier cases such as
Coker, where the Court held that "Eighth Amendment judgments should not
271 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
272 The rare imposition of the juvenile death penalty is not necessarily an indication that
the practice lacks popular support, but may instead be linked to the low number of offenders
deemed fit for such a severe punishment.
273 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 363 (1989).
274 Id.
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be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of individual Justices;
judgment should be informed by objective factors to the maximum extent
possible., 275  According to Justice Scalia, proportionality review and
national consensus must be the same inquiry, because looking at anything
other than the views of society would "replace judges of the law with a
committee of philosopher-kings. 276
Nevertheless, in Atkins, the Court departed from this view, taking the
position that "in cases involving a consensus, our own judgment is 'brought
to bear' by asking whether there is reason to disagree with the judgment
reached by the citizenry and its legislators. 277  The Atkins Court
supplemented its finding of a national consensus against executing mentally
retarded persons with its own independent judgment that the deficiencies of
mentally retarded persons diminish their personal culpability. This
impairment, argued the Atkins Court, undermined the likelihood that the
death penalty serves the goals of deterrence or retribution for such
offenders, making their execution cruel and unusual.278
In Roper, the majority similarly concluded that there is a national
consensus against the juvenile death penalty, and likewise supplemented
this finding with its own conclusions that the death penalty is inappropriate
for juvenile offenders due to their diminished culpability on account of their
immaturity. However, whereas in Atkins the Court casually introduced the
role of the Court's independent judgment, the Roper majority explicitly
stated that it is rejecting the view in Stanford that the Court's independent
judgment was irrelevant on the grounds that this view was inconsistent with
prior Eighth Amendment cases such as Thompson and Coker.27 9 The real
significance, however, is not the forwardness of the Roper Court in
disavowing the view in Stanford, but rather the fact that the majority's
independent judgments played the critical role in the decision. Compared
to previous cases, including Atkins, the case for a national consensus in
Roper was woefully inadequate.2 80 As the dissenters properly recognized,
the true impetus of the decision is the majority's independent moral
judgment that juveniles have diminished culpability compared to offenders
age eighteen and older.28'
275 Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
276 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 379.
277 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002).
278 Id. at 320.
279 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
280 See supra Part III.A.
281 Roper, 543 U.S. at 615 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Roper made the categorical rule that the death penalty may never be
imposed on an offender under age eighteen.282 Although the majority also
purported that this finding is based on a national consensus, as explained
above, the indicia relied upon by the majority remain unconvincing
compared to its earlier cases. 283 Thus, it appears the decision is truly based
on the majority's finding that "the differences between juvenile and adult
offenders are too marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful
person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient culpability. 284
Under Stanford, and even to a significant extent under Atkins, the Court was
limited to striking down only those punishments for which it could present
a plausible case of a national consensus opposing the practice. However, in
Roper, the majority showed that evidence of a national consensus could be
satisfied simply by cherry-picking the favorable indicia, essentially making
the inquiry a pretext for the subjective moral judgment of the Justices. The
critical problem with the Court granting itself the power to execute its
independent moral judgment is that it puts the entire meaning of what is
cruel and unusual in the hands of the Justices. Thus, if a majority of the
Court believes, based on their own moral judgment, that it is
disproportionate punishment to execute an offender, then the death penalty
itself could be declared unconstitutional so long as it was accompanied by a
facade of a corresponding trend in the indicia of a national consensus.
Without a genuine national consensus or at least some other grounding
principle, the meaning of the Eighth Amendment changes with "a show of
hands of the current Justices' personal views about penology. 285
The majority cited three principal reasons for its independent judgment
that juveniles are less culpable than adults. First, the majority claimed
juveniles often lack the maturity of adults, leading to poor decision-making
and high risk behavior.286 Second, juveniles are uniquely susceptible to
negative influences.287 Third, the character of juveniles is less formed than
adults, increasing the likelihood for reformation. 288 These findings are far
from earth shattering, consisting of everyday understandings of youthful
indiscretions. The first, and principal, problem with the majority's reliance
on these findings is that they are ultimately generalizations. Indeed, as
Justice O'Connor explained, these findings "fail to establish that the
282 Id. at 588-89.
283 See supra Part III.A.
284 Roper, 543 U.S. at 572-73.
285 Id. at 629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
286 Id. at 569.
287 Id.
288 Id.
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differences in maturity between seventeen-year-olds and young 'adults' are
both universal enough and significant enough to justify a bright-line
prophylactic rule against capital punishment of the former., 289 Thus, while
these findings may show most juveniles are too immature to have full
accountability, they do not illustrate that all juveniles are too immature for
full accountability.
The second problem with the majority's findings is that the scientific
and sociological justifications for its position do not provide a complete or
unbiased survey of the scientific and sociological data available. As Justice
Scalia noted, the American Psychological Association, on whose views and
studies the majority relies, found that juveniles lack the moral maturity to
be fully culpable for premeditated murder, but sufficiently mature to make
individual judgments about abortion.290 Insofar as this is an inconsistency,
it illustrates why the Court is "ill equipped to make the type of legislative
judgments the Court insists on making here."29' Quite worrisome is the
majority's failure to explain why certain studies were relied upon more
heavily than others, and its failure to adequately test the methodology and
reliability of the studies on which it relies. Indeed, the majority's deference
to the American Psychological Association permitted the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment to be driven by the uncontested findings of third party
organizations and their politicized amicus briefs. Revealingly, the majority
recognized its limited understanding of these issues, using the language "as
we understand it" as a qualifier when attempting to explain the relevance of
the American Psychological Association's refusal to diagnose persons
under age eighteen with personality disorders. Surely, constitutional law
should not be based on such imperfect, untested, and ambiguous grounds.
As Scalia notes, "[g]iven the nuances of scientific methodology and
conflicting views, courts-which can only consider the limited evidence on
the record before them-are ill equipped to determine which view of
science is the right one.
2 92
289 Id. at 601 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
290 Id. at 617 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
291 Id. at 616 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
292 Id. at 618 (Scalia, J., dissenting). To my knowledge, no contrary amicus briefs were
presented containing scientific evidence that juveniles are as competent as adults regarding
decision making capacity. However, the associations filing amicus briefs in Roper had the
benefit of their respective organizational backing. Undoubtedly, the views expressed in the
amicus briefs did not represent the beliefs of all their respective members. Nor did the briefs
present an unbiased review of all the academic literature on the topic of juvenile cognitive
development. Rather, the briefs advocated an official position adopted by these
organizations for undisclosed reasons. The dissenting members of these organizations would
not have been provided the official backing of the organization to commission competing
amicus briefs. Thus, the absence of competing amicus briefs regarding the cognitive
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According to Judge Posner:
The Justices in the majority should not have relied on a psychological literature that
they mistakenly believed showed that persons under eighteen are incapable of mature
moral reflection. The studies... do not support a categorical exclusion of sixteen and
seventeen year-olds from the ranks of the mature. At most, the studies demonstrate a
need for careful inquiry into the maturity of a young person charged with capital
murder.
2 9 3
Bringing Scalia's concern to light, Judge Posner aptly noted that the
majority conveniently failed to cite a study concluding that adolescents
"may be just as competent as adults at a number of aspects of decision
making about risky behavior., 294  Moreover, the Steinberg-Scott study,
cited by the Roper majority to support the claim that developmental
differences between juveniles and adults prohibit reliably making
determinations about the character of sixteen and seventeen-year-olds,295
admitted "at this point, the connection between neurobiological and
psychological evidence of age differences in decision-making capacity is
indirect and suggestive. 296 The study further noted that "[r]ecent evidence
on age differences in the processing of emotionally arousing information
supports the hypothesis that adolescents may tend to respond to threats
more viscerally and emotionally than adults, but far more research on this
topic is needed., 297  Judge Posner is correct that "[tihe Steinberg-Scott
study, coauthored by law professor Elizabeth Scott, is an advocacy article"
as evidenced by the fact it makes the ultimate policy conclusion that the
Court should abolish the juvenile death penalty. 298  The underlying
intersections between bias, advocacy, and science demonstrate the inherent
difficulty in separating fact from favorable spin. Surely, however, scientific
studies garnering policy conclusion and amicus briefs prepared by lawyers
cannot legitimately masquerade as unbiased and accurate scientific fact.
In another puzzling twist, the majority relied upon a study finding that
"[a]dolescents, as a group, are overrepresented in virtually every category
of reckless behavior, although recklessness does not necessarily
capacity of juveniles is just as likely to be the result of the associations internal politicking as
it is the result of a lack of scientific evidence refuting the associations official position.
293 Richard Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 64 (2005).
294 Id. at 65 (citing Lita Furby & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk Taking in Adolescence: A
Decision-Making Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 1, 36 (1992)).
295 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
296 Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003).
297 id.
298 Posner, supra note 293, at 65.
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characterize all adolescents, and recklessness varies in degree., 299  The
majority seized upon the former point, but gleaned over the qualifier that
not all adolescents are reckless and that adolescent recklessness often varies
in degree.3°° If not all adolescents are reckless, it cannot be presumed that
an adolescent involved in a capital murder necessarily suffers from
recklessness as a result of youth. Nevertheless, the majority offered the
study as scientific proof justifying its prophylactic rule prohibiting a jury
from ever concluding a juvenile is sufficiently culpable to warrant the death
penalty. While the majority recognized that in some rare cases juveniles
may be sufficiently culpable to warrant the death penalty, it failed to
substantiate its assumption that only in rare cases are juveniles not
inherently reckless, one of the three factors purportedly reducing juvenile
culpability. The tendency of a court to overemphasize complimentary
findings and overlook unhelpful ones illustrates why the Court should avoid
meddling in the realm of scientific studies.
The majority also inflated the significance of juvenile immaturity by
trying to compare it to mental retardation for purposes of diminished
culpability.30' In her dissent, Justice O'Connor correctly argued that
comparing the incapacities of mentally retarded persons to the immaturity
of sixteen and seventeen-year-olds is misleading, noting that "[s]eventeen-
year-olds may, on average, be less mature than adults, but that lesser
maturity simply cannot be equated with the major, lifelong impairments
suffered by the mentally retarded., 30 2  The intellectual abilities of an
average sixteen or seventeen-year-old are often advanced enough to study
Shakespeare and understand complex high school mathematics. On the
other hand, mental retardation is characterized by significantly sub-average
intellectual functioning, coupled with multiple limitations in basic skills
such as communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community
use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and
work.30 3 The level of a mentally retarded person's disability is clinically
measured by equating their intellectual abilities with the capacity of
children under the age of twelve.30 4 For example, Atkins was found to have
the mental capacity of a child between the ages of nine and twelve.30 5 The
299 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (citing Arnett, supra note 153).
300 Id.
301 Id. at 568-69.
302 Id. at 602 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also supra note 191.
303 MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5
(10th ed. 2002).
304 KAPLAN & SADOCK'S COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 2598 (Benjamin J.
Sadock & Virginia A. Sadock eds., 7th ed. 2000).
305 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308-09 (2002).
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poor judgment allegedly linked to the anatomical underdevelopment of the
brains of sixteen and seventeen-year-olds cannot fairly be likened to the
"substantial limitations [of the mentally retarded] not shared by the general
population., 30 6 The vast differences in cognitive ability between a mentally
retarded individual and a non-retarded individual are far greater than the
subtle and varying differences in intellect and judgment between a sixteen
or seventeen-year-old and those of an eighteen-year-old.
After Roper, it appears that little stands in the way for a majority of the
Court to conclude persons with poor educational backgrounds or other
similar social incapacities should be afforded heightened protections against
findings of ultimate culpability by a jury. As Justice Scalia noted, the
majority did not suggest a stopping point for its reasoning. "Why not take
other mitigating factors, such as considerations of childhood abuse or
poverty, away from juries as well? Surely jurors 'overpowered by 'the
brutality or cold-blooded nature' of a crime' ... could not adequately weigh
these mitigating factors either., 307  One possible stopping point is that
limitations on the criminal culpability of juveniles and the mentally retarded
can be scientifically linked to anatomical impairments relating to brain
function. Factors like childhood abuse or poverty, on the other hand, are
not physiologically linked to brain impairments, but are the result of
environmental influences. However, as science progresses, it is possible
that physicians will eventually be able to pinpoint physiological differences
in the brains of individuals raised in abusive or impoverished environments.
If human consciousness, and therefore culpability, can be reduced to brain
physiology, then mitigating mental conditions caused by environmental
factors, such as abuse or poverty, may be fundamentally indistinguishable
from mitigating mental conditions caused by genetic or developmental
factors, such as retardation or being seventeen-years-old. Certainly, a
mentally retarded person is no more culpable if her retardation was brought
about by being dropped as a baby rather than some genetic defect. If
culpability is reduced for offenders with anatomical brain differences,
culpability should be reduced regardless of the source of the physical
impairment, environmental or genetic. Thus, if the physiological brain
differences of the abused and impoverished, like those of juveniles,
eventually become "too marked and well understood," 30 8 then presumably
under Roper the Court must also remove these mitigating factors from the
306 Id. at 310.
307 Roper, 543 U.S. at 621 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In determining culpability, the
horrible nature of a crime would seem to suggest a jury should properly discount the weight
of a mitigating factor. Yet, the majority is inexplicably concerned by this precise possibility.
308 Id. at 572.
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realm of the jury in order to prevent an impoverished or abused individual
from "receiving the death penalty despite insufficient culpability. '"30 9 After
Roper, nothing stands in the way of the Court from removing death penalty
eligibility for any offender with an accepted mitigating mental condition
because of the risk that the condition may be overlooked by a jury due to
the brutal nature of a crime.
This brings to bear the central defect in the majority's proportionality
analysis: its complete failure to support the contention that a jury cannot
adequately account for youth as a mitigating factor in sentencing decisions.
The majority found "[a]n unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or
cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating
arguments based on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile
offender's objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity
should require a sentence less severe than death."3 1 However, as Scalia
noted, "[t]his startling conclusion undermines the very foundations of our
capital sentencing system, which entrusts juries with making the difficult
and uniquely human judgments that defy codification and that build
discretion, equity and flexibility into a legal system. ' 311 Nowhere does the
majority substantiate its finding that the jury system cannot adequately
account for a youthful offender's immaturity or "why this duty should be so
different from, or so much more difficult than, that of assessing and giving
proper effect to any other qualitative capital sentencing factor., 3 2  The
majority's only support for its position is that the American Psychological
Association refrains from diagnosing personality disorders in persons under
eighteen, and therefore it would be cruel and unusual for lay jurors to
condemn a juvenile to death when medical professionals are unwilling to
diagnose them with a particular condition.313 Of course, this reasoning does
309 Id. at 573.
310 Id. at 573.
311 Id. at 620 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
312 Id. at 603 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
313 Id. at 573. The American Psychological Association refuses to diagnose persons
under eighteen with personality disorders because juvenile immaturity purportedly prevents
psychiatrists from accurately evaluating if a juvenile's anti-social behavior is temporary. Id.
Assuming the policy of the American Psychological Association is sound, the question
remains how relevant reformation really is in the context of capital offenses where the
punishments are for the remainder of the offender's natural life. The Roper majority's
concern is that juveniles may be executed for anti-social behavior resulting from adolescent
immaturity, thereby making the death penalty disproportionate because of their less than full
culpability. Of course, the majority's rule gives culpable juveniles a free pass not afforded
to other defendants with temporary or permanent mitigating cognitive impairments, but who
are still forced to carry the burden of proving their impairment. One possible compromise,
unexplored in this article, would be to postpone juvenile sentencing decisions regarding the
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not explain why a jury cannot adequately consider the rationale of the
American Psychological Association in refusing to diagnose juveniles with
personality disorders or consider the individualized diagnosis of a juvenile
in making its determination of culpability. Indeed, the majority's logic
essentially permits the current policies of the American Psychological
Association to dictate the meaning of the Eighth Amendment without an in-
depth examination of its justifications for concluding that sixteen and
seventeen-year-olds are categorically less culpable than eighteen-year-olds.
Justice O'Connor is correct that simply because most seventeen-year-
olds are not sufficiently culpable to warrant the death penalty, it does not
follow that a seventeen-year-old cannot ever be culpable enough to warrant
the death penalty.314 Simmons' pre-meditated murder suggests the level of
depravity necessary to warrant the death penalty because the crime reflects
"a consciousness materially more 'depraved' than that of ... the average
murderer., 31 5  However, the Roper decision permanently removes the
question of ultimate accountability from jurors, ensuring that even if
Simmons was sufficiently culpable, he would not receive the death penalty
because of the majority's fear that a jury might impose the sentence on
some other undeserving juvenile. The question remains unanswered why
this risk does not apply equally to adult death sentences, where other
mitigating factors may also be ignored by zealous jurors. Moreover, the
majority fails to justify the necessity for its balancing act in light of its own
acknowledgement that the juvenile death penalty is infrequently imposed,
which suggests jurors "take seriously their responsibility to weigh youth as
a mitigating factor.,
3 16
Unlike mentally retarded persons and other adults who lack the
capacity to understand the wrongfulness of their actions, a juvenile can
possess the intellectual sophistication to understand right from wrong and
that murdering another human is both immoral and illegal. There is simply
no justification for why a juvenile offender's moral culpability should not
be examined on an individualized basis. The case of Lee Malvo, the
seventeen-year-old murderer who participated in the Washington, D.C.
sniper shootings, illustrates that individualized determinations of juvenile
culpability work in practice. Malvo was sentenced to life in prison because
death penalty until the defendant is old enough to accurately determine if their behavior
resulted from adolescent immaturity or instead stemmed from a medically diagnosable
personality disorder. If, after reaching maturity, a juvenile is still depraved, the majority's
concern would seemingly be satisfactorily addressed.
314 Id. at 599 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
315 Id. at 601 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319
(2002)).
316 Id. at 620-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the jury found that he suffered from a troubled past and was manipulated by
his adult accomplice, John Muhammad, and therefore was not frilly
accountable for his actions.317 Despite the brutal and cold-natured element
of the crimes, the jury was able to conclude that Malvo did not deserve the
death penalty.318 However, the jury in Roper found that Christopher
Simmons was fully accountable for his actions because he independently
planned and carried out a horrendous murder, bragged about it, and
deviously assumed he would get away with it because of his age.319 The
Roper jury found, despite evidence of Simmons youth, troubled childhood
and susceptibility to manipulation, that he possessed the maturity,
intelligence, sophistication, and moral culpability to warrant the death
penalty.320 The differences between the outcomes in these cases show that
juveniles, like adults, are not all the same. The moral culpability of juvenile
is not interchangeable based solely on chronological age, and the Roper
Court is wrong to use age as a proxy for an individual's culpability.321
317 Jury Sharply Split In Sparing Sniper Malvo, CNN.com, Dec. 24, 2003,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/12/24/sprj.dcsp.malvo.trial/ (last visited April 22, 2006).
318 Id.
319 Roper, 543 U.S. at 555.
320 Id.
321 Thompson set a rule that no one under the age of sixteen may be executed because of
the risk that state legislatures did not explicitly consider that fifteen-year-olds could be death
penalty eligible when they passed their death penalty statutes. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 857 (1988). However, Thompson implicitly suggested that so long as a legislature
explicitly considered permitting executions of juveniles younger than sixteen, such
executions would be allowable. See id. At common law, there was a rebuttable presumption
of incapacity to commit a felony at age fourteen, but a child as young as seven could be
convicted of a criminal offense and thus subjected to death if found to know the difference
between right and wrong. Etta J. Mullin, At What Age Should They Die? The United States
Supreme Court Decision with Respect to Juvenile Offenders and the Death Penalty, Stanford
v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REv 161, 163 (1990). However,
the youngest juvenile ever executed in the United States was George Stinney, a fourteen-
year-old executed in South Carolina in 1944. Connie de la Vega & Jennifer Brown, Can a
United States Treaty Reservation Provide a Sanctuary for the Juvenile Death Penalty?, 32
U.S.F. L. REv. 735, 736 (1998). Although it is plausible that a juvenile younger than
fourteen might have been subjected to the death penalty prior to Roper, empirically the
possibility seems remote. Admittedly, under the Court's pre-Roper framework whereby
society alone defined the contours of permissible punishment, the possibility existed that
society might permit executing a seven-year-old. Common sense dictates of course that the
political process and public opinion would stand in the way of allowing seven-year-olds to
be executed, just as these forces would prevent the repeal of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The remote risks of a runaway majority are simply the unavoidable perils of living in a
democracy.
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VI. CONCLUSION
After Roper, the threshold to achieve a national consensus is so
reduced that the entire inquiry becomes functionally irrelevant to the
Court's decision-making process. In its place emerges proportionality
review, which is ultimately a subjective determination made by the Justices
about whether the punishment fits the crime. The Eighth Amendment is
now cut loose from any grounding principles, and lurks behind a
fundamentally meaningless national consensus analysis. Looming in the
shadows is the question of how the Court will resolve the inevitable case
where its proportionality review renders a conclusion irreconcilable with
any credible facade of a national consensus.
Wayne Myers
